University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Psychology Faculty Publications

Psychology

1992

Psychology
David E. Leary
University of Richmond, dleary@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-facultypublications
Part of the Other Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Leary, David E. "Psychology." In The Encyclopedia of Higher Education, edited by Burton R. Clark and Guy R. Neave, 2136-2150. Vol. 4.
Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Political Science

Psychology
Although the discipline of psychology, in its contemporary form, is only a century old, psychology's
historical antecedents reach back to the beginnings
of civilization. Whether defined as the study of the
soul or the study of human faculties, as it was in
earlier times, or as the study of consciousness, mind,
or behavior, as it has been over the past hundred
years, psychology has dealt with some of the fundamental questions and issues pertaining to the functions, processes, and mechanisms of human and
animal nature.
Like all thought and action, psychology's theories
and methods-as well as its professional practiceshave reflected the historical and cultural contexts in
which they have emerged. In turn, these theories and
methods have been seminal in the development of
other humanistic and social scientific disciplines,
which have often looked to psychology for insights
regarding the nature and potential of humans and
other animals. As a result, psychology has been
one of the fundamental disciplines in the modern,
twentieth-century academy, especially in the United
States. Consequently, an understanding of the discipline of psychology will provide access to some of
the basic orientations and concerns of the cultures
from which modern psychology has emerged as well
as an introduction to some of the basic premises of
the academic disciplines that are related to it. Despite
its current centrality, however, it is possible that
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psychology may be dismembered and perhaps reconstructed in the coming decades. If this occurs, it
will probably be in response to changing cultural
concerns, new demands from other disciplines, and
the diverse trajectories of psychology's own varied
internal developments.

I. The Historical Background of Psychology
In 1979, modern scientific psychology celebrated its
centennial, as dated from the symbolic founding of
Wilhelm Wundt's psychological laboratory at Leipzig
University in Germany. Wundt's "new psychology"
represented a blending of subject matter from the
old philosophical psychology (which emphasized
consciousness and mentality) with new techniques
(especially experimental methods) derived largely
from physics and physiology. Although Wundt's own
program for psychology included the nonexperimental study of the higher mental processes, it was
the experimental study of the lower (sensory and
perceptual) processes that established psychology as
a scientific discipline, especially in the United States,
where individuals such as William James, G Stanley
Hall, and James McKeen Cattell introduced their
students and colleagues to the new kind of psychology in the 1880s.
Although this field of study focused at first upon
the laws governing the sensory and perceptual processes of human beings (as revealed primarily in the
study of adult White males), by the turn of the century psychologists were studying a broader range of
topics, human beings, and species, both as a result
of developments within the field itself and as a result
of pressure from the public at large. For instance,
widespread popular curiosity regarding the sorts of
psychic phenomena studied by the new, competing
field of psychical research (now known as parapsychology) had something to do with bringing
women, children, and other subjects outside the category of adult White males within the purview of
psychologists, and it also had something to do with
extending the scope of psychology to include the
experimental study of hypnosis, suggestion, emotion,
motivation, the psychology of belief, and abnormal
psychology.
At the same time, the practical needs of educators
and social reformers (both inside and outside the
field. of psychology) led to the development and
application of psychological knowledge in a variety
of social settings. In the United States, both the
extension of the public school system of education
and the First World War, by increasing the demand
for the valid and reliable assessment of students
and soldiers, helped to spur the development and
popularity of "mental testing." Counseling and other
types of clinical psychology and psychotherapy, as
they are known today, did not emerge until later, in
the 1930s and thereafter, in response to social needs

felt during the Depression and in the aftermath of
the Second World War.
By the 1950s, psychology had assumed the basic
shape in which it is found today, at least in the United
States, as both a well-established academic discipline
and a full-fledged profession. Although most universities had instituted psychology departments by
the early twentieth century, it was only in the 1950s
that psychology consolidated its central position in
the academy and that psychologists established a firm
hold upon major roles in the public workforce.
The success of psychology and psychologists in
both academic and nonacademic settings over the
subsequent decades is perhaps most succinctly, if
indirectly, indicated by the rapid increase in membership in the American Psychological Association
(APA). Founded in 1892, with 31 original members,
the APA had grown from 127 members in 1900 to 228
in 1910, 338 in 1920, 1,101 in 1930, 2,739 in 1940,
and 7 ,272 in 1950. Its growth from 1920 to 1950
was thus quite impressive. By 1960, however, the
membership of the APA had more than doubled to
18,215; by 1970, there were 30,839 members; by
1980, 50,933; and by July 1990, 70,266 (American
Psychological Association 1990). These numbers are
all the more remarkable when one considers that
since the 1970s many United States psychologists
have been leaving or refraining from joining the
APA, as they have evolved independent professional
organizations associated with their own specialized
subfields, and as a new general organization for psychologists came into existence in the latter portion
of the 1980s.

2. The Subject Matters of Psychology
Although the American Psychological Association is
no longer the sole general professional organization
for United States psychologists, much less for psychologists from other countries, its divisions give a
fair indication of the rich variety of concerns and
types of expertise represented by the discipline and
profession of psychology. By the late 1980s, there
were 45 different divisions in the APA, providing
professional support for psychologists whose scientific and professional interests range from experimental psychology to clinical psychology; from
evaluation, measurement, and assessment to humanistic psychology and health psychology; from
military, business, and consumer psychology to educational psychology, exercise and sport psychology,
and peace psychology; from children and youth services to adulthood and aging; from physiological
psychology to the psychology of art; from the history
and philosophy of psychology to human engineering
and psychopharmacology; from mental retardation
and other disabilities to lesbian and gay issues; from
the media to the law; and across an ever-growing
spectrum of human problems and therapies. In sum,
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the number of APA divisions has more than doubled
(from 19 to 46) since 1945, when the APA adopted a
divisional structure in an attempt to keep "pure" and
"applied" psychologists together-and yet separate-within the same organization (Hilgard 1987
pp. 756--62).
Despite the APA's tolerance for diversity at the
divisional level, the tension between its two major
factions, which inspired its divisional structure in the
first place, still remains. Today, however, the tables
are turned. The "applied" psychologists are now in
the clear majority and are perceived to be in control
of the APA. Although this is not entirely the case,
the tension between these two camps-roughly
speaking, between psychological scientists and psychological practitioners-led in 1988 to the transformation of a relatively small independent interest
group into a new psychological organization, the
American Psychological Society (APS). As of January
1990, this new organization had attracted some
11,000 members, and the APS is just one of many
alternative professional organizations for psychologists in the United States!
The other alternative organizations give a further
sense of both the diversity and quantity of psychologists. They range in focus from the Association
for Humanistic Psychology (with 5,000 members) to
the intensely scientific Psychonomic Society (with
2,400 members). Even a partial listing of these organizations fills six pages in the annual Encyclopedia of
Associations (Burek 1991). In addition, many psychologists belong to organizations that include scientists and professionals from other fields: for instance,
organizations representing those interested in animal
behavior, cognitive science, counseling, neuropsychology, organizational behavior, and visual
science. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that
there are many international organizations of psychologists (including the International Union of Psychological Science), and that in many countries other
than the United States psychologists have founded
their own national associations. In fact, the rate of
growth in the membership of many of these associations has surpassed even the APA's remarkable rate
of growth, though the APA remains the largest single
national association.
Another indication of the efflorescence of psychology is given in Ulrich's International Periodicals
Directory (Popilskis 1990) in which it takes 32 pages
of triple-columned, small print to list all the journals
of the field, exclusive of "Medical Science-Psychiatry and Neurology."
Yet another means of estimating the richness and
diversity of the field and profession of psychology
is to review the chapter headings in introductory
psychology textbooks. Although this will give only a
very general map of the subject areas of the discipline, this map should be a useful guide for those
outside the discipline.
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Before reviewing this map, an important preliminary point is that the map of psychology is both
central to and reflective of the larger disciplinary and
interdisciplinary map of twentieth-century academia.
In the United States, at least, disciplines have typically been categorized into the arts and humanities,
the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Psychology is distinctive in that it is rooted, in significant
ways, in each of these domains. This has caused
endless debates among those who feel that
psychology's continued affiliation with all three of its
roots is a sign of the discipline's immaturity, but from
another perspective this lack of narrow, pre-emptive
definition is simply a reflection of the multiplicity
and complexity of psychology's legitimate subject
matters.
In any case, not only did psychology's earlier form
(as philosophical psychology) come from the humanities, but its on-going central concern with mentality
and subjectivity (by no means shared by all psychologists) reaffirms this historical linkage. This concern assumes different shapes as many contemporary
psychologists focus upon a variety of traditional
humanistic issues. For instance, such topics as personality, self-identity, the meaning of life, the role
of values and religion, and the construction of one's
own "life story" illustrate the substantive, humanistic
issues that many psychologists feel are susceptible to
psychological modes of analysis. In turn, many of
these modes of analysis can be traced to psychology's
humanistic heritage.
At the same time, other psychologists take a
strongly social scientific approach to some of the
same topics as well as to the genesis, maintenance,
and alteration of norms, categories of understanding,
emotional reactions, and other forms of social
behavior. In recent decades, in fact, the social dimensions of psychological phenomena-including the
discipline of psychology itself-have received an
unusual amount of scrutiny. Ironically, this helped
to bring about something of a crisis for social psychology in particular and for psychologists in general.
This period of crisis, now considerably abated, was
associated in the 1970s with the rise to prominence
of Kuhn's (1970) notion of "scientific revolutions,"
with their attendant reigning "paradigms." A small
army of scholars applied Kuhn's analysis of science
to the history of psychology, trying to determine if
psychology enjoyed paradigmatic status as a mature
science. They generally concluded, instead, that it
suffered from its "preparadigmatic" condition.
Although these episodes in the recent history of
psychology helped to exorcise some of the ghosts of
naive empiricism, they are now fading into memory
as psychology-at least in the United States-settles
into a period of renewed confidence, in which multiple metaphors and models rather than a universal
paradigm provide guidance for a readily admitted
and largely accepted variety of psychological theories
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and practices. Many of these metaphors and models,
even outside the domain of social scientific
psychology, remain resolutely social in character (see
Leary 1990).
Besides humanistic and social scientific approaches, psychology has also boasted a biological
or natural scientific orientation. Since the very beginning of modern scientific psychology, which grew out
of "psychophysics" and "physiological psychology,"
the physical correlates and biological nature of psychological phenomena have been studied. Even in
the heyday of behaviorist psychology, from the 1920s
through the 1950s, specifically biological psychology
(including sensory and neurological psychology) was
pursued by some of the discipline's finest scientists.
It was not, however, as central as some wished it to
be. In recent decades, despite the "cognitive revolution" in psychology (Gardner 1987), this relative
neglect has been overcome, as physiological and
biological psychologists have strongly advanced their
subdiscipline. Indeed, some of them have even
brought traditional humanistic and social scientific
topics within the purview of biologically oriented
psychology (e.g., Buss 1991) and attempted to link
physiology with cognition in various "connectionist"
models (e.g., Rumelhardt et al. 1986). Such efforts
have captured the interest of many, though they have
also drawn the skepticism of others (e.g., Pinker and
Mehler 1989).
The basic point of this rapid and very general
survey of the large domains represented by psychology-the humanistic, social scientific, and natural scientific domains-is that psychology is a
multifaceted discipline that deals with multiple and
sometimes conflicting aspects of human and animal
nature. In the typical introductory psychology textbook, this multiplicity is portrayed as extending
across the major subfields discussed below.
2.1 Biological Foundations
Without a doubt, three of the most important books
in the history of modern psychology are Darwin's On
the Origin of Species (1859), Fechner's Elements of
Psychophysics (1860), and Wundt's Principles of
Physiological Psychology (1874). Each, in a variety
of ways, helped to establish the biological foundations of modern psychology.
More than is sometimes realized, Darwin's evolutionary biology set the framework within which
laypersons, scientists, and practitioners have pondered psychological phenomena over the past
c:ntury. In erasing the hard lines that once separated
different species, Darwin generated a tradition of
t~inking and research that led to the theories and
discoveries of such individuals as G J Romanes, C
LI.oyd Morgan, John B Watson, Robert M Yerkes,
Niko Tinbergen, and Konrad Lorenz. In other
words, he stimulated the creation of the modern
fields of comparative psychology and ethology, which

study the commonalities and differences in behavior,
including instinctual or "fixed action" patterns of
behavior, across species (for contemporary developments in these fields, see Dewsbury 1989).
Similarly, in focusing attention upon the importance of the functions of behavior, Darwin influenced
the development of a functional approach to psychology: an approach that focuses primarily upon
the functional utility, or consequences, of cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral processes rather than
upon their "essential nature." This functional
approach has been represented by William James,
James Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, Edward L
Thorndike, Robert S Woodworth, Edouard Claparede, Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, BF Skinner, and
(in one way or another) the majority of contemporary
United States psychologists.
Finally, in his discussions of the fundamental roles
played in evolutionary history by sexual selection
and the expression of emotions (see also Darwin
1871, 1872), Darwin not only fostered comparative
psychology and ethology, but also triggered the
Freudian revolution, which began as a radically new
way of conceiving and treating human dysfunctions
and has ended up permeating cultural and professional modes of thought. As a result, whatever the
failings of psychoanalysis per se, Freudian concepts
(and their Darwinian presuppositions) are now part
of "common sense." (On Darwin's influence upon
Freud, see Ritvo 1990.)
Fechner's contributions to psychology were less
monumental in scope, but for sensory and perceptual
psychology, they have been no less significant. Along
with E H Weber, Hermann von Helmholtz, and
Ewald Hering, Fechner elaborated methods-and
made discoveries-regarding the reliable, quantitative relationships between sensory stimuli on the
one hand, and psychological sensations and perceptions on the other. In doing so, he helped to
establish the foundation upon which twentieth century "sensory science" has grown. Without question,
it was basic research like Fechner's that proved the
possibility of a rigorously scientific (i.e., experimental and quantitative) psychology. The subsequent tradition of sensory and perceptual research
is rich and broad. It includes the work of such individuals as Edward B Titchener, Christine LaddFranklin, Max Wertheimer, E G Boring, Georg von
Bekesy, S S Stevens, James J Gibson, Eleanor J
Gibson, Leo M Hurvich, and Dorothea Jameson,
who have made important contributions to our
understanding of the nature and processes of sensation and perception (see Hochberg 1979 for an
analytic survey):
Wundt took Fechner's "psychophysics," combined
it with elements of Darwin's evolutionary theory
and Helmholtz's sensory physiology, and initiated
"physiological psychology." Carried up to the
present day, this tradition accounts for the neuro2139
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physiological and biological research that is almost
invariably reviewed in the first substantive chapter
of psychology textbooks. This research attempts to
explain the physical underpinnings of cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral phenomena, including the
evolutionary, genetic, sensory, and perceptual
phenomena that interested Darwin and Fechner.
In this tradition, Charles Sherrington, Walter B
Cannon, Karl Lashley, Donald 0 Hebb, AR Luria,
Frank Beach, Brenda Milner, Karl Pribram, James
Olds, and Neal Miller, among many others, have
made important contributions (see Thompson and
Robinson 1979). The conceptual products of their
labor have entered public consciousness through discussions of reflexes, biofeedback, "split brain" (leftbrain, right-brain) phenomena, endorphins and
pleasure centers in the brain, biological rhythms,
REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, PMS (premenstrual
syndrome), and neurotransmitters. For an area of
psychology that was relatively neglected during much
of the behaviorist era in psychology (c. 1920-55),
physiological psychology has had a large following
and impact since that time.

2.2 Learning
From the very beginning of scientific psychology,
individuals such as William James (1890) emphasized
the importance of the kind of learning that leads to
"habits." This emphasis upon learning as revealed
in repetitious thoughts, feelings, and behaviors has
typified much of United States psychology since that
time. In combination with an emphasis upon the
reinforcing quality of the consequences of behavior,
mentioned in the previous section, this led to a distinctively functional approach to learning (or habit
formation) in the United States.
Edward L Thorndike (1911), James's student, performed the classic experiments that led to the formulation of "the law of effect," according to which
the satisfaction or discomfort (pleasure or pain)
resulting from a behavioral response is assumed to
strengthen or weaken the probability of that response
in similar situations in the future. Later, Skinner
(1938) developed his own version of the Jaw of effect,
a version in which "reinforcers" are defined by their
correlation to behavior, without reference to
pleasure or pain as explanatory causes. In the 1960s,
this "Skinnerian" or "operant" approach to learning-and its application in "behavior modification"became popular as a means of bringing about change
in individual behavior. To this day, especially in the
United States, Skinnerian psychology has made a
difference in how many people (inside and outside
of psychology) think about-and go about-the process of "shaping behavior" in childrearing, classroom
teaching, work management, mental hospitals, and
other situations (see O'Leary and O'Leary 1972).
A different, reflex-based approach to learning
came from the research of Pavlov (1927), a Russian
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physiologist who explored how new ("conditioned")
reflexes are formed in association with natural
("unconditioned") reflexes. Without fully adequate
knowledge, the United States psychologist John B
Watson (1916a) argued in his 1915 presidential
address to the APA that this sort of "conditioning" is
the primary mechanism of learning. Given Watson's
notoriety as the founder of United States "behaviorism" (the school of psychologists who insist that
psychology can be scientific only to the extent that it
studies observable behavior), it is not surprising that
his advocacy helped to establish "Pavlovian" or
"classical" conditioning as a major theory of learning
in twentieth-century psychology.
Before too many years passed, however, it became
clear that classical conditioning could not explain a
great many learned behaviors. In addition to
Skinner, "neo-behaviorists" such as EC Tolman and
Clark Hull pointed out the limitations of a strictly
reflex-based approach to learning. This led to various
attempts to develop a "two-factor" approach to
learning (e.g., Rescorla and Solomon 1967) and to a
continuing debate about the exact nature of, and
relations between, "classical" and "operant" forms
of learning.
In recent decades, several trends have become
apparent, foreshadowed (respectively) by the work
of Hull (1943) and Tolman (1948). First, there has
been a notable increase in the study of the biological
conditions and limitations of learning (see Matthies
1989). Second, there has been a considerable
increase of interest regarding the role of cognition in
learning, even in animal learning (see Estes 197578). This interest is apparent in social learning
theory, which emphasizes observational learning, or
"vicarious conditioning" (Bandura 1977b). This new
cognitively oriented approach-like classical conditioning and operant conditioning in earlier decades-has influenced the development and use of
therapeutic techniques (see Wilson and O'Leary
1980). Its rise in popularity has been correlated with
a shift in research from the earlier indirect study of
human learning by means of the investigation of
learning in other species, to the direct study of human
learning in real-world settings.

2.3 Cognition
The recent cognitive turn in learning theory is
reflective of a broader "cognitive revolution" in psychology. This revolution has brought psychology back
to its pre behaviorist orientation as a cognitive (or
mental) as well as a behavioral science. In the
early days of scientific psychology, the focus upon
human mentality was represented by Herman Ebbinghaus (1885). Ebbinghaus's classic work on human
learning and memory, first published in 1885, was
distinguished by its invention and use of nonsense syllables (as well as poetry) as the material
that he himself memorized in order to study the fac-
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tors involved in remembering and forgetting.
Ebbinghaus's work initiated a long tradition of
research on the rote learning of verbal items. Unfortunately, many of the explanatory concepts generated by this tradition are no longer tenable (see
Cofer 1979).
Although the Ebbinghaus tradition extended
through the behaviorist era (c. 1920-55), it was only
in the later 1950s that modern cognitive psychology
began to emerge. Miller's (1956) famous article on
the limits of the human capacity for processing information was an important stimulus. After surveying a
wide range of psychological phenomena not typically
treated together, he concluded that an individual's
ability to distinguish stimuli, phonemes, numbers,
and other items reached a significant threshold on or
around "the magical number seven." Either learning
or the design of our nervous system, he inferred,
"keeps our channel capacities in this general range"
(p. 86).
"Channel capacities" was a concept being used at
that time by several British investigators, including
Colin Cherry and Donald Broadbent, who were developing a new information-processing approach to
psychology. This approach grew out of applied psychological research begun during the Second World
War, and it was given an influential expression in
Broadbent's Perception and Communication (1958).
A huge amount of theoretical and empirical work
has been done since that time on "information processing" (see Lachman et al. 1979). This line of
research also draws upon cybernetic theory and communication theory. It is still very much alive, being
continually refueled by on-going developments in
computer science.
Also in the 1950s Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin
published A Study of Thinking (1956), which broke
new ground regarding experimental methodology as
well as the formation and acquisition of concepts.
Treating their subjects as active, constructive problem solvers rather than passive reactors to stimuli,
they asked them how they had gone about their tasks
of ~lassifying and categorizing stimuli. Based upon
then subjects' experimental responses and their
retrospective reports, they concluded that the best
explanation for the overall patterns of their subjects'
res~onses was provided by the "strategies" these
subjects had employed. In other words, they sug~es!e~ that it was not individual stimuli that triggered
md1v1dual reactions, as a strict behaviorist for~u~ation would have led them to believe, but rather
md1vidual stimuli within the context of a particular
cognitive framework.
From these and other sources, the cognitive revoluti.on in psychology came about. The actual
coming-of-age of cognitive psychology is often dated
from the publication of Neisser's text on Cognitive
Psychology (1967). Since then, the literature has
grown exponentially. A sense of this growth can be

garnered from a perusal of some of the major
journals founded in little over a decade: Cognitive
Psychology (1970), Cognition (1971 ), Memory and
Cognition (1973), Cognitive Science (1977), Cognitive Therapy and Research (1977), and Brain and
Cognition (1982). In addition, most of the older
psychology journals have been "cognitivized" in one
way or another. In sum, psychology has gone
thoroughly cognitive, as it once went thoroughly
behavioral.
2.4 Motivation
Whether psychology has been cognitive or behavioral
in orientation has made little difference as regards
the psychology of motivation. In either case, the
"motor" dimension of psychological phenomena has
been problematic for the discipline. It is small
wonder, then, that Freudian psychology has had an
appeal even among those who are most critical of it
(e.g., see Watson 1916b). By putting motivation
front and center in psychoanalysis, Freud (1916-17)
made it a fundamental rather than a secondary concern of twentieth-century theories of personality and
psychotherapy (e.g., Murray 1938). Relatedly,
McDougall's (1923) "hormic psychology" emphasized the role of instinctual motives, thus foreshadowing later research in both animal and human
ethology (see Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989).
Other psychologists have investigated motivation,
not as instinctual, but as drive, bodily need, stimulation, incentive, and neural excitation; and still
others have pointed out that external, distant stimuli
(such as strange objects) can motivate spontaneous
fear or exploratory behavior. The latter reaction
suggests that organisms may opt, under certain conditions, to seek increased sensory and cognitive
stimulation rather than decreased arousal or tension
reduction.
Yet another concern has been intrinsic motivation:
the apparent tendency of humans to act for such
"internal rewards" as the pleasure involved in the
activity itself, the sense of intellectual challenge,
the satisfaction of curiosity, and the achievement or
mastery of a task. Following Bandura (1977a) and
others, there is still a good deal of work to do in this
area.
Similarly, there is much to do regarding so-called
social motivation. Although many of the needs specified by Murray and his associates (1938) fall into this
category, it was Harlow's (1958) research on attachment behavior among rhesus monkeys that brought
this dimension of motivation to the attention of many
psychologists. Subsequent work on "script theory"
by Tomkins (1979) and others, though aimed primarily at an understanding of emotional expression,
also has implications for social motivation.
At the other end of the spectrum, biological
research has continued to reveal the biological substrates and limitations of motivation (see Grossman
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1979). Of particular interest has been the work begun
by J M Delgado, W W Roberts, and Neal Miller,
which has attempted to determine how learning can
be motivated by the electrical stimulation of the
brain. This research led to the notion of "pleasure
centers" in the brain that may account for the
reinforcement of learning and to continuing research
on "self-stimulation" as a central basis of motivation.
This latter research, in turn, has drawn attention to
the "natural opiates" in the brain (such as dopamine),
the release of which may similarly account for motivation (see Wise and Rompre 1989).
Clearly, there has been a lively history of thought
and investigation regarding human and animal motivation, yet as noted previously, motivation has been
problematic for psychologists. This is no less true at
the present time, when the rise of cognitive psychology seems to be correlated with a decline of
interest in motivation (see Hilgard 1987 pp. 378-81).
However, the need to explain the "pushes" and
"pulls" of thought, emotion, and action seems certain
to bring the pendulum swinging back again,
especially if some useful, empirically testable, integrative approach to motivation is discovered.

2.5 Emotion
The picture regarding the study of emotion is very
similar. Although virtually everyone will agree that
emotions are vitally significant in human experience,
they have proven somewhat elusive as objects of
study. Perhaps the easiest way to convey the range
of current approaches is to categorize emotions into
those pertaining to the body, to the mind, and to
culture.
The classic bodily approach is best represented by
Cannon (1927), who tried to specify a physiological
mechanism that could account for emotion defined
as the perception and feeling of bodily changes.
Research along this line subsequently gave way to a
revival of Darwin's (1872) expression theory, which
focuses upon emotions as inherited bodily
expressions (smiles, frowns, stares, etc.) that have
helped species survive. On-going cross-cultural
research along this line has led Ekman and his associates (1987) to the conclusion that there are six basic
facial expressions of emotion-anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, sadness, and surprise-that are truly universal. Related to this research are studies that suggest that the facial muscles are linked to the
autonomic nervous system, through which breathing,
heart rate, and other vital dimensions of emotion
are controlled. Finally, there is now a considerable
amount of work focused on the role of hormones,
particularly epinephrine and norepinephrine, which
clearly influence the body's state of arousal.
The cognitive approach to emotion has received
considerable attention in recent decades. Much of
this attention has stemmed from the two-factor
theory proposed by Schachter and Singer (1962).
2142

According to this theory, the experience of an emotion depends upon the feeling of physiological
arousal plus a cognitive interpretation of that arousal.
If this is so, the same physiological response could
provide the substrate for two different emotional
experiences, depending upon how a person labeled
that response. Although the original experimental
evidence for this theory has been difficult to replicate,
subsequent research has shown that cognition does
play a significant role in emotional life. For instance,
it now seems clear that ways of thinking can influence
the intensity of emotions and that cognitive values
are associated with the range of emotions that people
are likely to experience. Though much research
remains to be done, it seems s.afe to say that emotions
cannot be separated from the rest of mental life
(Frijda 1988).
The cultural approach to emotion has typically
tried to differentiate those emotions and emotional
expressions that are specific to particular cultures
from those that seem to be universal (Ekman et al.
1987). While all cultures distinguish positive emotions (such as admiration, amusement, joy, and love)
from negative emotions (such as fear, hatred, shame,
and sorrow), there are many cultural variations as
regards the objects of emotion (the things one feels
emotional about), the situations in which emotions
are felt, and the ways in which emotions are
expressed.
All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that
insofar as emotions are biologically based, psychologists are well advised to seek universal factors;
and insofar as they are cognitive and social constructions, psychologists had better attend to historical and cultural factors. As noted elsewhere in
this article, such tension between the universal, on
the one hand, and the historical and cultural, on the
other, is a typical characteristic of psychology in
general. As in other areas of the discipline, it poses
a central challenge for future research on emotion.

2.6 Development
Developmental psychology is an integrative area
that cuts across the entire spectrum of psychology.
Virtually every aspect of psychological functioning
-ranging from psychoneurological functioning
through cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functioning-changes systematically over time, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Developmental psychologists try to describe and explain the regularities
associated with such changes, frequently relating
experiences in one period of life with developmental
patterns in another.
In its earliest days, developmental psychology
focused upon maturational studies of animal and
human-infant development, and upon the motor,
cognitive, and characterological development of children. Hilgard (1987) has provided a useful overview
of the history of the field, including the major longi-
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tudinal studies that have contributed to the relatively
recent emergence of a more complete, life-span
approach to human development. Although child
psychology remains the largest subfield of developmental psychology, a great deal of attention is now
devoted to adolescence, adulthood, and aging (see
Datan et al. 1987, Petersen 1988).
When one surveys the history of developmental
psychology, many individuals-Alfred Binet, G
Stanley Hall, James Mark Baldwin, Arnold Gesell,
Erik Erikson, and many others-deserve mention,
but if one person symbolizes the emergence of this
subfield into prominence since the 1950s, it would be
Jean Piaget. The work of this Swiss psychologist,
extending from the 1920s through the 1970s (see
Gruber and Voneche 1977), revolutionized the study
of cognitive development and provided one of the
major stimuli to the study of both cognition and
development as alternatives to the behavioristic focus
on certain prescribed forms of objective conduct.
Also, his hypothesis that there are universal stages
of development has posed both promise and challenge to a generation of psychologists, so that even
non-Piagetian research owes a great deal to his inspiration.
In addition to cognitive development, linguistic
development has received much attention over the
past century, and especially over the past several
decades. Falling between the extremes of contingent
"verbal behavior" (Skinner 1957) and innate "transformational generative grammar" (Chomsky 1957),
the field of psycholinguistics has spawned a variety
of research traditions that have tried to account for
the nature and development of language. Given the
critical importance of language to humans, to other
animals, and (now) to machines, this will inevitably
remain an area of primary concern. Not surprisingly,
psychologists have tried to use computers to generate
an understanding of language, but with limited success (Schank and Rieger 1974).
There has also been a good deal of research on
social development, starting with "bonding" or
"attachment" in infants (see Ainsworth 1979) and
including such topics as "sex typing" (see Maccoby
1980). While experience plays a large role in such
processes, it seems clear that certain internal factors
are also involved in social development. At the beginning of the 1990s, a great deal of research on the
biological foundations and constraints on social development is going on, and it promises to continue
into the future. In this research, the amount of developmental variance due to "nature" and the amount
due to "nurture" are likely to remain of focal interest.

2. 7 Personality
To many nonpsychologists, the study of human personality is what psychology is-or should be-all
about. But in fact, personality was a relative latecomer to the map of twentieth-century psychology

(beginning around the time of Allport 1937), and it
has never enjoyed the unqualified support of the
majority of scientific psychologists. This is at least
partially due to the fact that an understanding of
"personality" in all its facets demands truly interdisciplinary study. At one end of the spectrum,
biology has had an increasing amount to say about
personality in recent years (e.g., Buss 1991); at the
other end, cultural anthropology and other humanistic disciplines have contributed significantly to the
elucidation of the cultural context and historical variation of human personality (e.g., Carrithers et al.
1985). Such a wide-ranging topic, with a variety of
dimensions, is indeed difficult to pin down once and
for all.
It is not only the biological/cultural dimension
that challenges personality psychologists. Instigated
largely by Sigmund Freud and his followers, psychologists have also been deeply interested in the
unconscious/conscious dimension of personality.
Indeed, much of twentieth-century personality theory and research has taken its cue from psychoanalytic assumptions and concerns. The work of
Murray and associates (1938) represents a blending
of these assumptions and concerns with some of the
methods that have come to typify United States
personality psychology. Many psychologists have followed in this tradition.
A different tradition of theory and research has
focused upon personality types and traits. In a very
real way, this approach-whether keying upon global
personality types or specific personality traits-is an
updated version of age-old common sense
psychology. It has flourished from the start of the
scientific study of psychology right up to the present
time (Funder 1991).
Throughout much of the middle part of the twentieth century, especially in the United States, a
behavioristic approach to "personality" (defined as
the typical behavior patterns of an individual) was
also pursued-or at least it was presumed to be
the proper approach-by many psychologists (e.g.,
Dollard and Miller 1950). Although it has failed to
eclipse alternative theories, it has led to an increased
sensitivity regarding the importance of "situations"
and the utility of thinking of personality in terms
of an "interaction" between innate tendencies and
situational factors. In recent times, social learning
theory and other forms of cognitive behaviorism have
expanded earlier, restrictive forms of behavioral personality theory (see Pervin 1985).
Such expanded forms of behavioral psychology are
at least partially a result of the criticism of behaviorist
approaches on the part of so-called "humanistic psychologists." In-the United States, these psychologists
(e.g., Rogers 1961) have played an important role in
directing attention to the active, knowing, valuing,
and intending aspects of the human self, aspects
that fell outside the normal purview of the more
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traditional physiological, psychoanalytic, and behaviorist approaches to personality functioning.
As United States psychology has become more
inclusive in its conceptual framework over the past
few decades, thus permitting cognition and consciousness to play central roles (again) in the
description and explanation of personal dynamics,
the field of personality psychology has become richer,
more diverse, and more complex. Buss and Cantor
(1989) have gathered contributions reflecting recent
trends and emerging directions in the field. Some of
these trends and directions-including the trying out
of new units of analysis, looking for new measures
of coherence, and developing new means of assessment-are especially promising insofar as they indicate that personality psychologists are moving
beyond their former excessive reliance upon empirical studies of college students using self-report measures administered in single-occasion laboratory or
classroom settings. Such studies are unlikely to yield
nonobvious, important truths about human per.sonality.

2.8 Other Areas-and Beyond
Psychology has spawned many other subfields,
including social psychology (see Social Psychology
[Vol. 3, Sect. V]), abnormal psychology, psychological assessment, educational psychology, industrial
and organizational psychology, human factors psychology, forensic psychology, political psychology,
and counseling and clinical psychology. Most of these
latter subfields have an "applied" focus and draw
upon the "pure" research conducted within the
subfields treated in the above sections. It is worth
noting, however, that these latter subfields (and
others like them) account for the vast majority of
activity engaged in by psychologists.
In addition to these subfields, a number of new
"interfield" disciplines have grown up around the
edges of the map of psychology. Together with physiologists, neurologists, and clinical pathologists, for
instance, psychologists have created the booming
field of neuroscience, or brain science (Kandel 1982).
This new field is necessarily interdisciplinary and
collaborative, given the amount of knowledge and
various kinds of methodological sophistication
needed to pursue it. As Thompson and Robinson
(1979) have noted, at the very least one now needs
a neurophysiologist, a neuroanatomist, a neurochemist, and experts in neuropharmacology and
neuroendocrinology, not to mention behavioral
scientists, in order to mount a contemporary program
in what was once physiological psychology. In their
assessment, the trend is clearly toward neuroscience
and away from psychobiology per se.
Similar developments have Jed to the development
of behavioral genetics and cognitive science, fields in
which scientists outside psychology play a major role
alongside psychologists. Combining modern genetics
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with the study of behavior, behavioral genetics investigates the influence of genetic endowment upon
an individual's behavior. This new field is rapidly
becoming a leading area of inquiry (see Plomin and
Rende 1991). Cognitive science is even better known
and is probably even more fully populated, having
developed over the past decades at the intersection
of anthropology, artificial intelligence, computer
science, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, and
cognitive psychology (Gardner 1987). Interestingly,
this relatively new "interdiscipline" is already being
challenged by the even newer "connectionist" movement (see Hunt 1989 p. 625).
Although each of these collaborative enterprises
still needs the theoretical and empirical grounding
provided by more traditional psychology, it is not
clear that psychology will emerge whole from its
participation in these fields. As discussed below, it is
possible that psychology will be dismembered in the
coming decades. At the same time, however, it seems
probable that recently invigorated subfields-such as
crosscultural psychology, environmental psychology,
evolutionary psychology, and health psychologywill more than fill any vacated spaces on psychology's
map and in psychology's textbooks.

3. The Methodological Values of Psychology
Methods of many sorts have been used for millennia
by scholars, scientists, and their predecessors, but
since the 1880s psychologists have exhibited a
stronger than usual tendency to focus their attention
upon methodology, prescribing and institutionalizing
the proper, legitimate techniques that are to be used
by practitioners of their discipline. Indeed, the establishment and reliance upon methods of observation,
experiment, measurement, analysis, and theory construction have been characteristic features of scientific and professional psychology in the United States
right from the start.
Outside the United States, reliance upon these
same prescribed methods, particularly upon empirical data-gathering and quantitative analysis, has
tended both to lag and to emerge in a more attenuated form. Insofar as the application of these
methods outside the United States constitutes a form
of imitative behavior, it can be contrasted with the
frequent and sometimes virulent criticisms of United
States "methodism" on the part of non-American
psychologists. Such criticisms, it should be noted,
have implications for the ways in which the subject
matters of psychology are construed (see Shotter
1975).
Although sometimes overemphasized, the methodological orientation that has typified twentiethcentury psychology, primarily in the United States,
is (in its less extreme manifestations) one of the
discipline's glories. Even some of those who have
been critical of the shortsighted, rote, and theor-
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etically inconsequential manner in which psychologists have sometimes applied their methods believe
that these methods have now been developed to a
point where they can assist psychologists in elucidating the relationships and structures still hidden
within or behind psychological phenomena (Luce
1985). Whether this is so or not, the belief that it is
so-the belief in the value of prescribed methodsis clearly a defining feature of the culture or ethos of
the discipline. Indeed, trust in the critical importance
of articulated methods is so deeply schooled into
psychologists that even psychological practitioners,
who may be critical of scientific methods, tend
strongly to accept the need for prescribed clinical and
applied methods. In fact, professional certification in
any number of fields depends upon the assimilation
of such methods.
The value that is accorded to methods in United
States psychology derives partially from the discipline's historical association with logical positivism.
After relying previously upon a naive form of empiricism, as reflected in Watson's (1913) behavioristic
manifesto, United States psychologists came under
the influence of logical positivism in the 1930s.
Although the assumptions fostered by this philosophy of science have been subjected to an extensive critique (see Toulmin and Leary 1985), they still
represent many of the operative values in the discipline. Objectivity defined as intersubjective agreement, reliability defined as replicability, precision
defined as quantitative measurement, and validity
defined as anchored or tautological description: these
are some of the methodological hallmarks of modern
psychology. So too is knowledge defined as prediction and control, though this is part of
psychology's social-reform legacy rather than its
association with logical positivism. This latter hallmark, too, has been criticized-for example, in favor
of a definition of knowledge as a means of understanding and change rather than as a means of prediction and control (Gergen 1982)-but many
psychologists continue to espouse a rather narrow
utilitarian view of psychological knowledge.
In the aftermath of the behaviorist era in
psychology, which began to fade in the 1950s, most
observers have reported that the backbone of psychological theory and practice has been undergoing
metamorphosis. However, it is still far from certain
what the methodological and epistemological posture-or postures-of psychology will be in the
future. Though it has been loosening its methodological strictures, it seems unlikely that the discipline of psychology will become flexible enough to
allow its theorists and practitioners to generate new,
broadly encompassing visions of its subject matters
comparable in scope and in historical significance to
those generated by modern psychology's pioneers,
who were less fettered by methodological fastidiousness. Interestingly, the theoretical visions of

the discipline's early pioneers continue to orient
much of the discipline and profession, albeit with
diminishing returns, down to the present day (Loevinger 1985).
The future of psychology seems to promise, and
to depend upon, an increasing number of local metaphors ("models") and a decreasing number of
universal metaphors ("paradigms"), more domainspecific theories and fewer overarching syntheses;
but then, who would have predicted that the recent
computer and information-processing metaphors
would reach across so many domains of psychology
(see Hoffman et al. 1990)? Perhaps the evolving
cognitive science of recent years, founded upon
metaphors that are coextensive with the field's technological and methodological tools, will provide a
megatheory capable of connecting and holding
together a variety of subfields in psychology. But
probably not, for the extent of cognitive science's
reach seems directly related to its ignoring many
supposedly irrelevant details that contribute to the
concrete reality of everyday psychological experience. However deep the methodological imperative
within the culture of modern psychology, the call of
concrete experience will almost certainly continue to
intrude at opportune (and inopportune) moments,
directing psychologists' attention to the insufficiency
of any single metaphor or model and to the correlative need for fresh perspectives and novel
approaches (see Leary 1990).

4. The Social and Cultural Setting of Psychology
Awareness of the need for fresh perspectives and
novel approaches in psychology has been spurred by
the relatively recent rise in sensitivity, among many
psychologists, regarding the socio-cultural embeddedness of their discipline and profession. (This
awareness is expressed by many of the contributors
to a volume-Koch and Leary 1985-that contains
numerous retrospective assessments of the first century of psychology.) As psychologists have become
more conscious and less defensive about the social,
cultural, and other "nonrational" factors that influence the development of psychological theory and
practice, they have begun to deal more directly,
again, with questions of ideology and value, frequently dropping the presumption (fostered by naive
empiricism and logical positivism alike) that science
can and should be culture-free (or value-free) in any
complete and radical way.
Not only regarding the application and utilization
of psychology, but also regarding the processes of
psychological o~servation, measurement, and theory
construction, questions about the cognitive frameworks, social purposes, and ultimate values of psychology (and psychologists) have come to the fore.
It seems certain that neither the social origins nor
the social consequences of psychology have ever been
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more clearly recognized and so deeply probed (see
Buss 1979). In the area of theory, such awareness
has enfranchized a "social constructionist movement" in the discipline (see Gergen 1985), while in
the area of application, it has underscored the extent
to which psychology has been so influential that it
tends to "make itself true-or false" by means of the
effects it has upon individuals, society, and culture
(Macintyre 1985).
Among the issues that have arisen within this context, those pertaining to the nature of the relationship
between the sociopolitical ideology of the discipline,
on the one hand, and the problem selection, datagathering, theoretical interpretations, and practical
applications of psychologists, on the other, are surely
among the more sensitive. In this regard, recent
United States scholarship (e.g., Sampson 1978) has
echoed earlier scholarship by non-American critics
of United States psychology (e.g., Holzkamp 1972).
It is reasonable to assume that psychologists will
continue to give serious attention to these kinds of
issues in the years ahead.
A solid foundation for such scholarly attention has
been laid, over the past few decades, by a new
generation of historians of psychology. Building
upon the earlier work of such individuals as Edwin
G Boring and Robert I Watson, Sr, these more recent
scholars-frequently trained as psychologists but
drawn to historical analysis by their puzzlement
about the status and prospects of the discipline-have
generated scholarly societies, journals, and graduate
programs as well as an extensive new literature on
the history of psychology (see Hilgard et al. 1991).
A representative sample of this new historiography
can be seen in volumes edited by Ash and Woodward
(1987) and Morawski (1988).
What has emerged, in general, from recent historical scholarship on the discipline and profession of
psychology is a view of psychology's embeddedness
within the stream of history and culture. Rather than
something destined to evolve as it has because of the
nature of things and the processes of human knowing,
psychology has come to be seen as the product of
many individuals working within particular social
contexts toward goals framed by the larger currents
of cultural history. For instance, if United States
psychology has assumed aspects of the role once
played in higher education by intellectual and moral
philosophy, if it has tended to generalize from malecentered experience to supposedly universal truths,
if some of its theories have been reflective of the
religious traditions within which their proponents
were raised, and if the metaphors that have inspired
its theoretical constructions and oriented its practical
routines have been assimilated from its surrounding
culture, these facts are simply indicative of
psychology's distinctive history within one particular
social and cultural milieu (see Leary 1987).
In other social and cultural settings, psychology
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has assumed somewhat-and sometimes drastically-different forms. Not only the sociology of the
discipline (its training procedures, modes of communication, professional roles, social status, reward
systems, and so on), but also its subject areas, theoretical structures, and practical applications have
differed substantially from one country to another
(Rosenzweig 1991, Sexton and Hogan 1990).
Although Canadian psychology has been very similar
to United States psychology, the various national
traditions of European and Soviet psychology have
been markedly different in their definitions,
methods, and concerns, and they have prepared their
adherents for very different social roles. More distinctive still, the psychologies of the Third World
have been developed into their own indigenous
shapes for the sake of their own individual aims (e.g.,
see Ardila 1982).
The recognition of this cultural as well as historical
variation is important, for it suggests the need for
greater awareness-and more critical analysis-of
the cultural demands and historical trends that influence the perception, thought, and behavior of psychologists. On a very practical level, it also suggests
that aspiring psychologists should supplement the
necessarily technical aspects of their education with
broader cultural and humanistic studies. Indeed, the
need for liberal education on the part of aspiring
psychologists, including the need for historical and
multicultural education, is something to which psychologists and educators should give serious attention.
The dawning awareness of psychology's embeddedness in time and space does not discredit all
of its previous discoveries nor does it fatally jeopardize its prospects, but it warrants greater sensitivity
and responsiveness to the sociocultural context of
psychology, and psychological phenomena. As one
non-American psychologist has put it, students and
practitioners of the discipline should come to understand that psychology has been
a discipline cultivated mainly in the industrialized countries (in the "First World") and not so much m other
nations. Contemporary psychology is largely an AngloSaxon discipline that shares the values and assumptions
of English-speaking countries, particularly of the United
States; some of these values and conceptions seem to be
alien to [Third World] way[s] of thinking. (Ardila 1982
p. 120)

Increased recognition of the cultural dimensions of
psychological theory and practice would underscore
one of the major challenges for the psychologists of
the future, namely, to draw the line, more accurately,
between what is truly "universal" and what is in fact
"historical" and "cultural." In a world that promises
to be increasingly interconnected, uncovering the
historical and cultural dimensions of psychological
phenomena-and of psychology itself-may be just
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as important as discovering what is universal in
human and animal nature.

5. Conclusion: General Trends and Prospects
Until fairly recently, most psychologists expected
their discipline to develop in a progressive, cumulative manner toward an ever-increasing systematic
unity. Although this ideal has been promulgated in
the twentieth century chiefly by the logical positivist
philosophy of science, it has by no means been the
goal of that intellectual movement alone. In fact, it
was a clearly articulated goal of the empiricist and
idealist philosophies of science that dominated the
nineteenth century; it is still espoused by many scientific psychologists (e.g., Staats 1981); it has been no
less the goal of some recent advocates of a humanscientific approach to psychology (e.g., Giorgi 1970);
and it has even been claimed as a fait accompli
by some contemporary psychologists (e.g., Kimble
1989).
Nonetheless, a great many psychologists have
come to believe that their discipline has not developed progressively toward a coherent system of
thought and practice. On the contrary, they believe
that psychological knowledge has been noncumulative and that the discipline of psychology has
become increasingly fragmented rather than unified.
In a volume devoted to a representative survey of
the first century of psychology, for instance, Gibson
(1985) concluded that the knowledge gained over
the last hundred years in his field of sensory and
perceptual psychology has been insignificant as well
as incoherent; Gleitman (1985) wondered if psychology has really progressed much beyond what
Wundt knew and supposed about cognition; de
Rivera (1985) pointed out that the psychology of
emotion has not only become isolated from the other
subfields of psychology but has even become internally fractured into a variety of sub-subfields; Loevinger (1985) suggested that in some ways there may
actually have been regression in the study of human
character; and Kendler (1985) admitted that
although behavioristic psychology has made some
progress, it has accomplished far less than anticipated
just four decades ago.
In addition to its noncumulative development, psy~hology's fragmentation has received astute analysis
m the work of Koch (1976), who believes that "psychological studies" would be a better title for the very
loose federation oftopics, methods, and investigators
that constitute what is now called "psychology." The
basic insight underlying Koch's argument for this
redesignation of psychology, which was considered
~n extremely radical argument when first advanced,
is now accepted by many mainstream psychologists.
For instance, Hilgard (1987), a former president of
the American Psychological Association, concludes

his magisterial historical survey of the discipline with
the observation that:
the idea of a unified science of psychology may be more
an esthetic ideal suggesting harmony and a common
front in facing the other sciences than a practical goal
for psychological science. Psychology can be conceived
as a large family of many psychologies, unified by social
practice and the disciplinary structure of universities.
(Hilgard 1987 p. 803)
And yet another, more recent president of the
American Psychological Association, William Bevan
(1986), has argued not only that "psychology is a
nonlinear discipline," but that it is not really "a
simple coherent discipline but a collectivity of studies
of varied cast." It seems to him that "the character
of psychology is seen in the rapid proliferation of
rather narrowly focused and increasingly insular
intellectual communities" (pp. 367-68). Even though
the work of these relatively isolated groups of psychologists has led to many "exciting developments"
and even "brilliant individual advances" of the discipline, Bevan believes that psychology now "faces a
critical period in its development as a coherent body
of knowledge." This crisis, he notes, is related as
much to "the sociology, the psychology, and the
economics of the academic enterprise" as to the
"flawed intellectual character" of the discipline itself
(pp. 366--67).
While the sociology, psychology, and economics
of the academic enterprise-and their influence upon
the development of psychology and other disciplines-might be pondered with profit by those in
higher education, the intellectual challenge of simply
comprehending, much less integrating, all that is
going on in the various areas of psychology is perhaps reason enough to suggest that the future may
witness a deconstruction-or dismemberment-of
"psychology." (Although the internal fragmentation
of psychology has been going on for quite some time,
its various fragments are still encompassed within the
typical map of psychology.) Whether or not psychology is to be dismembered, however, it is clear
that the age of grand unifying theories, methods,
applications, and programs in psychology-which
crested in the 1930s and 1940s-is long past.
Leaders in higher education may find it daunting
to contemplate the potential metamorphoses in psychology's future. The scenarios for the discipline's
reconstruction are at least as numerous as the recipes
for its deconstruction. But, in fact, it is unlikely that
academic psychology as we know it will change its
institutional form abruptly and radically, given the
economic forces impacting upon the academy. In
the short run," the various fields of psychology will
probably continue to move along their current
trajectories, sometimes connecting with developments in other disciplines and forming new interdisciplinary enterprises that overlap the bound2147
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aries of psychology. Whether or not any of these new
enterprises will eventually become fully independent
academic disciplines, as cognitive science and
neuroscience are trying to do today, it seems likely
that much of the important work on traditional psychological topics and concerns is likely to be done at
the interdisciplinary matrices linking psychology and
other fields.
Looking toward this necessarily uncertain future,
fully aware that the developments of the past century
have fallen short of fulfilling all the hopes and promise that accompanied the establishment of the "new
psychology," it is nonetheless palpably clear that
most psychologists have retained a commitment to,
and confidence in, their own particular portion of
psychology. Though sometimes dissatisfied and
impatient with the progress of their discipline or
subdiscipline, their persistent desire for better theory
and practice (as illustrated in the contributions to
Koch and Leary 1985) is perhaps the discipline's
greatest strength. Though often searching for new
directions, they are far from ready to give up the
quest begun a century ago by Wundt, James, and
their contemporaries. Whether they are interested
in consciousness, mind, or behavior, psychological
theory or therapeutic practice, pure science or public
policy, or any other domain of psychology, today's
psychologists have plenty to do, as will tomorrow's,
throughout the world. They may do it inside or
outside the current boundaries of the discipline and
inside or outside the academy, but one thing seems
certain: their education within the academy is likely
to spell a large measure of their success.
See also: Social Psychology (Vol. 3, Sect. V)
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